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THE VALUATION OF STOCK IN A CLOSELY-HELD
CORPORATION FOR FEDERAL GIFT AND
ESTATE TAX PURPOSES
ROBERT A. SPREcBmA*
Whenever shares of corporate stock are the subject of a
gift or form part of an estate it becomes necessary to evaluate
such shares for the purpose of Federal Gift or Estate Taxes.
Treasury regulations provide that the value of property in
general and of stock and bonds in particular shall be, for tax
purposes, the "fair market value." Stock in a widely-held
corporation can be evaluated in a relatively simple fashion by
ascertaining actual market value. But stock in a closely-held or
"family" corporation is seldom listed on any exchange and if
it is listed, the market value is not the "fair market value"
defined in the regulations. How can such shares be evaluated
for tax purposes9
The best introduction to the subject of valuation of closely-
held stock is contained in a passage from the Board of Tax
Appeals decision in the case of James Couzens:1
"Nothing could better reveal the lack of a recognized standard for
ascertaining value than this record. Opinions were as freely sought
from and given by witnesses who could only give a categorical answer
to the ultimate question of value with no supporting reasons for their
opinions as those who had by a meticulous analysis assigned a relative
weight or significance to each fact or assumption and arrived by
mathematical processes at a figure of value. These witnesses included
executive heads of automobile manufacturing corporations, account-
ants, engineers, economists, statisticians, bankers, brokers, and
teachers. This testimony was all treated by counsel as expert testi-
mony. The opinions were received in evidence in the light of the
qualifications which the examination of the witnesses disclosed. The
conflict of opinion however and the diversity of reasoning by which
such opinions were arrived at indicate that the problem of valuation
of the common stock of a closely owned manufacturing corporation
has not yet been developed so far that any particular method of
reasoning in respect of it is authoritative or any particular class of
* B. S., 1938, J. D., 1941, Northwestern University; Lecturer,
De Paul Umversity Law School; Member of the Chicago Bar; Author,
Industrial Disputes in Time of War and Peace. (1941) 36 Ill. L. Rev.
290.
11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928) at pp. 1164-5. This case is discussed at
length supra.
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persons may be recognized as experts. There is likewise no method
of arriving at such value which, so far as our research and the briefs
of counsel show, has been established in the law as controlling. The
facts and circumstances must be fully known in each case together
with any available evidence of their interrelation and importance, and
from this in its entirety the independent judgment of the Board must
be derived."
The process of evaluating closely-held stock is thus one of
considering and weighing the various factors and elements whnch
the Treasury Department, the Board of Tax Appeals (now
known as the Tax Court), and the courts have determined to be
of importance.
I. TaE FACTORS REQUIRED BY THE REGULATIONS TO BE
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF
CLOSELY-HELD STOCK
The Federal Gift Tax statute provides as follows -2
"If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of
the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift."
The Gift Tax regulations provide -3
"The statute provides that if the gift is made in property, the
value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of
the gift. The value of the property is the price at which such property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell. The value of a
particular kind of property is not to be determined by a forced sale
ISection 1005 of the Internal Revenue Code, which reenacts
Sec. 506, 1932 Act.3 Art. 19 (1), Reg. 79, as amended by T.D. 4901 (May 18, 1939).
Art. 10(a), Reg. 80, as amended, pertaning to the Federal Estate
Tax, is similar. Prior to the amendment of May 18, 1939, Art. 19(1)
provided as follows in the 1936 Edition of Reg. 79:
"The statute provides that if the gift is made in property, the
value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the
amount of the gift. The value of the property is the price at
which such property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion
to buy or to sell. The value of a particular kind of property is
not to be determined by a forced sale price or by an estimate
of what a whole block or aggregate would fetch if placed upon
the market at one and the same time. Such value is to be deter-
mined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value at the
time of the gift of each unit of the property. For example, in
the case of shares of stocks or bonds, such unit of property is a
share or a bond. All relevant facts and elements of value as of
the time of the gift should be considered. Depreciation or
appreciation in value subsequent to the time of the gift are not
relevant factors and will not be considered. (Italics indicate
parts of 1936 Regulation omitted by the amendment of May 18,
1939.)
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price. Such value is to be determined by ascertaining as a basis the
fair market value at the time of the gift of each unit of the property
For example, in the case of shares of stock or bonds, such unit of
property is a share or a bond. All relevant facts and elements of
value as of the time of the gift should be considered."
After this statement of valuation of property in general,
the regulations provide the basis for the valuation of stocks and
bonds .4
"The value at the date of the gift in the case of stocks and bonds,
within the meaning of the statute, is the fair market value per share or
bond on such date.
"If actual sales or bona fide bid and asked prices are not available,
then. the value is to be arrived at. in the case of shares of
stock, upon the basis of the company's net worth, earning power,
dividend-paying capacity, and all other relevant factors having a
bearing upon the value of the stock. Complete financial and other
data upon which the donor bases his valuation should be submitted
with the return."
In nearly every case of valuation of closely-held corporate
stock, the courts or the Board of Tax Appeals expressly state
that the three elements of valuation required by the regulations
-net worth, earning power and dividend-paying capacity-have
been given full consideration. If other relevant factors have
been presented, the regulations require that they also be con-
sidered, but the courts do not always state that such factors have
been considered. However, since net worth, earmng power and
dividend-paying capacity must be considered, they are the most
important factors and the other factors are dealt with as supple-
mentary
A. EARNINGS
1. Importance of Earnings.
The Board and courts have on several occasions indicated
that earning power is the most important of all factors m deter-
mining the value of the stock in a closely-held corporation.
In the leading case of James Couzens,5 the taxpayer had
sold 2,180 shares of stock in the Ford Motor Co. for
$29,308,857.90, an average price of $13,444.43 per share. The
stock had been acquired prior to March 1, 1913, for $44,900, a
Art. 19 (3), Reg. 79, as amended by T.D. 4901 (May 18, 1939).
Art. 10(c), Reg. 80, as amended, pertaining to the Federal Estate
Tax, is similar. Prior to the amendment of May 18, 1939, Art. 19(3),
as provided in the 1936 Edition of Reg. 79, was substantially identical
to the article as it now stands.
11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
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price stipulated to be less than the fair market value on March 1,
1913. Therefore for gain or loss purposes under the income tax,
the basis of the stock was the value as of March 1, 1913. In his
1919 return, the taxpayer computed his gain on the basis of a
1913 value of $9,489.34 per share, resulting in a gain of
$8,622,096.70. The Commissioner computed the stock value at
$3,547.84 per share, resulting in a gain of $21,574,406.70.
The Board of Tax Appeals valued the stock as of March 1,
1913, at $10,000 per share, resulting in a gain of only
$7,508,857.90. The Board said -6
"The evidence throughout the proceeding indicates what would
otherwise seem reasonably clear, that the primary data from which
value of this stock should be 3udged are those relating to the corpora-
tion's earnings, and especially those affecting the extent of earnings
which might reasonably be expected in the future. All other data
are apparently probative only in so far as they help to measure future
earnings. Standing alone, the entire past history of the company
means nothing as to money value except as it has become embodied
in convertible assets at the date in question. To liquidate a business
or its assets requires no knowledge of its history. But in a case such
as this, the historical facts are considered because the prospects must
be gauged; and they are relevant only in so far as they illumine the
future. There is nothing dogmatic about it. The conventional statis-
tical studies covering five years preceding the date in question have
no sanction per se, but only if, sensibly considered, they provide some
index of wealth to come. So the trend of past events and statistics is
important in a business such as this because it helps to indicate
whether the business is expanding, and, if so, how rapidly
"Since it appears clearly from the evidence that the earnings are
entirely consistent with all the other data, earnings may fairly be
looked upon as reflecting the financial progress and condition of the
business. They are a financial compendium of the several factors
which otherwise indicate the trend. The purpose of a business such
as this is to make profit, and its stock should be appraised with refer-
ence to this. Primarily, the earnings are the test of success of the
past and the indication of the future. The other statistics-of
production, sales, etc.-and the description of the management
and its methods and plans, serve to give depth and perspective to
the earnings. Such other facts help to indicate the safety with which
the earnings may be relied upon as indicating a normal or healthy
condition. They are significant not of their own weight or force but
only in their relation to earnings."
In the Estate of James P Hooper,7 the decedent died on
August 3, 1933, leaving as part of his estate 3,613 shares of the
stock of the William E. Hooper and Sons Co., which were held
in trust for the benefit of decedent and his wife. The executor
did not include the property of the trust in decedent's estate.
I Ibid. at pp. 1170-1.
"41 B.T.A. 114 (1940).
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The Commissioner included the trust property, valuing the
shares at $100 per share.
The Board of Tax Appeals valued the shares at $45 per
share. The Board said :s
"A study of all of the evidence convinces us that there were no
actual sales of the stock to serve as a basis for determining what a
willing buyer and a willing seller would agree upon as a fair price.
In the absence of sales, the material factors to be considered in deter-
mmmg the fair market value of the stock of a close corporation, such
as we are now dealing with, are: earning capacity and anticipated
profits; book value; dividend yields; and such other facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the corporation and its business as would
be considered by a prospective buyer and seller. A prospective buyer
would give some consideration to the book value of $145 a share.
He would realize, however, that the company was a going concern,
and that, even if it be assumed that the book value could be realized
upon the liquidation of the corporation, there was no indication that
it was to be liquidated. Moreover, he would also realize that 'minor-
ity stock interests in a "closed" corporation are usually worth much
less than the proportionate share of the assets to which they attach.'
Cravens v. Welch, 10 Fed. Supp. 94. In our opinion, the factor
which he would consider as the most important would be .hat the
stock would earn. See Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 Fed.
(2d) 147."
2. The Period of Earnings to be Considered.
Randolph Paul says -9
"The standard earnings valuation formula capitalizes the earnings
of a representative period at a given rate. The word 'representative'
signifies a 'fair selection of years,' a period which reasonably affords
a basis for prediction as to the future. The rate to be 'used is sup-
posed to conform to the risk factors in the industry and the particular
business. This short statement of the underlying principle is enough
to point to the difficulties of the problem. If we are to take the earn-
ings of a representative period in the past, what is a representative
period? How many years shall be included in the period? How
shall we allow for peculiar nonrecurring conditions which may have
no bearing upon the future?
"The number of years constituting a representative period is
not a question of law, but one of fact. No definite number of years
can be made to apply to all cases; the length of the period to be con-
sidered is to be determined in each particular case. A fair estimate
can result only when the past years considered are fairly indicative
of the probable future earnings. Cases vary to the number of years
to be taken. Ordinarily the period to be taken should not be less
than five years. Abnormal years, whether above or below the aver-
age, should be eliminated."
Paul's statement that the period should not be less than
five years finds support m.A.R.M. 34, discussed supra, where the
capitalization formula is applied to "average earnings over a
8Ibtd. at p. 129.
9 Paul, 2 Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, pp. 1290-1.
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period of years prior to March 1, 1913, preferably not less than
five years. "
In White and Wells Co. v Conmsswner,10 the sole point
in dispute was the amount of profit realized by the taxpayer m
1920 upon the sale of a paper box factory as a going concern
and this in turn depended upon the value on Afarch 1, 1913.
The court said :"1
"The Board of Tax Appeals was of opinion that the going con-
cern value on March 1, 1913, should be predicated upon operating
results covering the years 1910, 1911, and 1912; and, by applying to
these years the formula for the computation of good will value set
forth in Appeal and Review Memorandum 34 (2 C.B. 31), the Board
obtained the figure it adopted, $31,441.60. Had the formula been
applied to the five-year period, it would have produced the value
claimed by the petitioner; namely, $73,689.75.
"The application of the said formula is not the exclusive way to
value good will; but its use in appropriate cases has been sanctioned
not only by the Board of Tax Appeals but also by this court.
Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co. v. Blair (C.C.A.) 30 F (2d) 614.
If it is to be used, however, it should be so applied as to be a fair
measure of valuing good will; that is, the past earnings to which the
formula is applied should be such as fairly reflect the probable future
earnings. As stated by the general counsel of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, ordinarily the period taken should not be less than five
years, and abnormal years, whether above or below the average,
should be eliminated. S. R. 5545, IV-2 C.B. 242. See, also, Inde-
pendent Aetna Sprinkler Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 521, 534;
Mead Cycle Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 887, 895; D. M. & E.
Walter & Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 620, 629; Appeal of C. F.
Hovey Co., 4 B.T.A. 175. Pertinent also are state tax decisions
recognizing that abnormal years should either be disregarded, or a
long enough period taken so that unusually bad years may be offset
by unusually good ones in order to get a fair average. In re Dupig-
nac's Estate, 123 Misc. Rep. 21, 204 N.Y.S. 273, 281; In re Ball's
Estate, 161 App. Div. 79, 146 N.Y.S. 499, 503; In re Bolton's Estate,
121 Misc. Rep. 51, 200 N.Y.S. 325, 327; In re Lincoln's Estate, 114
Misc. Rep. 45, 185 N.Y.S. 574, 576. This the Board did not do in the
case at bar. It included the year 1911, which was evidently ab-
normally poor, since it was under the same price-fixing contracts as
the profitable years 1910 and 1912, but it refused to include either of
the exceptionally good years of 1908 and 1909. The reason given
for their exclusion, namely, that they fell under contracts antedating
those in effect on March 1, 1913, we cannot regard as valid. The
issue before the Board was not the value of the particular five-year
contracts under which the taxpayer was operating on March 1, 1913,
but the value of the good will at that date. Even if the contracts
had been so unfavorable to the taxpayer as to result in operation at
a loss for the contractual period, it would not necessarily follow there-
from that the taxpayer had no good- will in 1913. Other factors
relevant to the probable future earnings of the factory for an indefi-
nite future time would have to be considered. The experience of the
company in the past, though under contracts other than those in force
at the time, would normally be an appropriate consideration. The
formula which the Board applied can result in a fair estimate of
-50 F.(2d) 120 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1931).
' Ibid. at pp. 121-2.
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good will only when the past earnings which are considered are
fairly indicative of the probable future earnings. Hence we think
it was erroneous to apply the formula to a period of only three years,
one of which was exceptionally poor.
"The petitioner asks us to direct the Board to apply the formula
to the five-year period, which would result in fixing the value of
good will at the figure $73,689.75. We do not think we are at liberty
so to do. The period to be used is, within limits of fairness of ap-
plication, to be determined by the Board. It may select a longer
period than five years or a shorter period, if the years selected fairly
reflect average past earnings.
'Without the use of the formula, the record is not sufficient
either to sustain the valuation adopted by the Board or the valua-
tion claimed by petitioner."
3. The Rate of Capitalization.
(a) The A.R.M. Formula and Intangibles.
The capitalization formula set out in A.R.M. 3412 is a
method for determining the combined value of tangible and
intangible assets. The average tangible assets over a certain
period of time is first determined. Then a certain percentage
(10% in the example given) of the average tangible assets is
deducted from average earnings over a similar period and the
remaining average earnings are allocated to intangible assets and
capitalized at a certain percentage (20% in the example given)
The value of intangibles thus found is added to the total tangi-
bles, which is the book value at the date for which value is being
sought.
A.R.M. 34 reads as follows .13
"The third method and possibly the one which will most fre-
quently have to be applied as a check in the absence of data neces-
sary for the application of the preceding ones, is to allow out of
average earnings over a period of years prior to March 1, 1913, pre-
ferably not less than five years, a return of 10 per cent upon the
average tangible assets for the period. The surplus earnings will
then be the average amount available for return upon the value of
the intangible assets, and it is the opinion of the Committee that this
return should be capitalized upon the basis of not more than five
years' purchase-that is to say, five times the amount available as
return from intangibles should be the value of the intangibles.
"In view of the hazards of the business, the changes in popular
tastes, and the difficulties in preventing nnitation or counterfeiting of
popular brands affecting the sales of the genuine goods, the Com-
mittee is of the opinion that the figure given of 20 per cent return
on intangibles is not unreasonable, and it recommends that no higher
figure than that be attached in any case to intangibles without a very
clear and adequate showing that the value of the intangibles was in
fact greater than would be reached by applying this formula.
"The foregoing is intended to apply particularly to businesses put
out of existence by the prohibition law, but will be equally applicable
"22 C.B. 31.
"Ibid. at 32-3.
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so far as the third formula is concerned, to other businesses of a
more or less hazardous nature. In the case, however, of valuation
of good will of a business winch consists of the manufacture or sale
of standard articles of every-day necessity not subject to violent
fluctuations and where the hazard is not so great, the Committee is
of the opinon that the figure for determination of the return on
tangible assets might be reduced from 10 to 8 or 9 per cent, and that
the percentage for capitalization of the return upon intangibles might
be xeduced from 20 to 15 per cent.
"In any or all of the cases the effort should be to determine what
net earnings a purchaser of a business on March 1, 1913, might
reasonably have expected to receive from it, and therefore a repre-
sentative period should be used for averagmg actual earnings,
eliminating any year in winch there were extraordinary factors
affecting earnings either way. Also, in the case of the sale of good
will of a going business the percentage rate of capitalization of earn-
ings applicable to good will shown by the amount actually paid for
the business should be used as a check against the determination of
good will value as of March 1, 1913, and if the good will is sold upon
the basis of capitalization of earnings less than the figures above
indicated as the ones ordinarily to be adopted, the same percentage
should be used in figuring value as of March 1, 1913."
In using this formula, the percentages to be selected depend
upon the risk and hazard of the industry itself and of the
particular company under consideration. The following table of
percentages have been employed in different cases.
Per cent of average
tangible assets
deducted
from
average earnings
DuPont v Deputy,
26 F Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939)
A. R. R. 2954, CB 11-2, p. 202
Citrus Soap Co. v Lucas, 42 F (2d)
372 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930)
A. R. R. 252, CB 3, p. 46
Dwight and Lloyd Sintermg Co.,
1 B. T. A. 179
G. R, Kinney Co., 26 B. T. A. 1091, 1097
Cushing v. U. S., 18 F Supp. 83 (1937),
aff'd. sub. nom. U. S. v. Dickinson,
95 F (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938)
C. F Hovey Co., 4 B. T. A. 175
Grant Trust and Savings Co.,
3 B. T. A. 1026
Gould Coupler Co., 5 B. T. A. 499, 512
Hupfel Co., 9 B. T. A. 944, 950
Shanley and Furness, 21 B. T. A. 146
St. Louis Screw Co., 2 B. T. A. 649
Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co.,
9 B. T. A. 264, 268
Corning Glass Works, 9 B. T. A. 771, 788,
modified, 37 F (2d) 798 (App. D. C.,
1929), cert. den. 281 U. S. 742 (1930)
Central National Bank, 29 B. T. A. 719
6%
7%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
9%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Per cent at
winch average
earnings al-
locable to
intangibles
are capitalized
12%
10%
8%
11%
15%
15%
15%
20%
33%%
16%%
15%
15%
20%
20%
10%
10%
209o20%
STOCK VALUED FOR TA:XATION 333
The manner m which the A.R.M. 34 formula is employed is
clearly set out m DuPont v Deputy .14
"Dr. Friday also determined the value of Christiana stock by
another accepted method. He examined the balance sheets of
General Motors and DuPont Company and determined that the tangi-
ble assets of these companies as shown by their statements amounted
to $674.19 per share of Christiana Securities common stock. In other
words, the tangible assets back of Christiana were less than $700
per share. Any other value of Christiana stock would be repre-
sented by good will, patents, formulae, or excess earning power.
6% of the tangible assets yielded $40.45. Deducting that amount
from the earnings of $90.71 he found the average excess earnings
of $50.26 to be earnings attributable to intangibles. Capitalizing
$50.26 at 12% he found the value of intangibles to be $418.83.
Adding the value of the tangibles and intangibles he arrived at a
value of $1,093.02 for a share of Christiana Securities Company. This
method of determining value is a form of valuation which has been
recognized and used by the courts for many years. It is founded on
the principle that a business man will expect a return of at least 6%
on money invested in tangible assets. Generally the courts have not
used more than five years purchase in determining the value of
intangibles or good will."
The method is also set out in A.R.R. 2954:15
"The Committee is of the opinion that the fair value of the
appellant's assets as of March 1, 1913, should be computed upon the
basis of a 7 per cent return upon tangibles and a 10 per cent return
upon intangibles. This basis is arrived at after a careful study of
the earnings of the corporation from the date of its organization in
1889. The average earnings after taxes of the appellant for the five-
year period 1908 to 1912, inclusive, were 1.98x dollars. After allow-
ing a 7 per cent return upon the average tangibles of the period, 9.38x
dollars, the amount of the earnings allocable to the intangibles is
1.33x dollars, and the capitalization of these earnings upon a 10 per
cent basis shows that the value of the intangibles as of March 1, 1913,
was 13.27x dollars. The book value of the tangibles on July -
1919, was 8.24x dollars and the appreciation to March 1, 1913, carried
down to July - , 1919, per A-2 letter dated September -, 1922,
was .49x dollars. The depreciated cost of the tangibles as of
July - , 1919, was, therefore, 8.72x dollars, and the total cost or
fair market value of tangibles and intangibles as of March 1, 1913,
on the date of sale, was 21.99x dollars. The profit, therefore,
realized by the appellant on the sale of its assets in 1919 is shown
by the following:
Dollars
"Sold for ................................................................ 30x
Dollars
"Book value of tangibles on July - , 1919 .... 8.24x
"Appreciation to Mar. 1, 1913 ........................... 49x
"Good will Mar. 1, 1913 .................................... 13.27x
22x
Net profit ....................................... 8x"
"26 F Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939), at p. 780.
' C.B. H1-2, p. 202, at p. 205.
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(b) The Straight Capitalizaton Formula.
In cases where value is thereby clearly reflected, it is possible
to employ a simple capitalization formula of average earnings
multiplied by a certain percentage, which is determined by con-
sidering the ordinary rate of return for the industry and for the
company under consideration. Such a formula does not neces-
sarily ignore good will and other intangibles, but instead of
employing two known quantities as in the A.R.M. 34 formula
(average tangible assets and average earnings), it uses merely
one (average earnings)
In DuPont v Deputy,16 the straight capitalization formula
was used and approved, and the result was further fortified by
the fact that the value was approximately the same when the
A.R.M. 34 formula was applied. In that case the taxpayer had
made a gift of 8600 shares of common stock in the Christiana
Securities Company by executing two trusts of 1600 shares each
on December 15, 1934, and nine trusts of 600 shares each on
December 22, 1934. In his return the taxpayer valued the
shares at $1,080 per share. The Commissioner valued the stock
at $1,812.329 per share and assessed a deficiency The taxpayer
paid the deficiency under protest and then brought suit against
the Collector in the District Court.
The Commissioner had determined the value of the stock
by using the market prices of the stocks which the Christiana
Securities Co. held. Both sides introduced expert testimony
The Court gave the greatest consideration to Dr. David Friday,
one of the taxpayer's experts. Dr. Friday's value of $1,093.02
per share, computed by means of the A.R.M. 34 formula, is
discussed snfra. He found a value of $1,088.52 per share by
means of a straight 8%% capitalization formula. The Court
said .17
"Dr. Friday determined that the value of 8600 shares of Chnst-
lana Securities stock could not be determined by the prices brought
by the sales of a few shares; that such value could only be deter-
mined by an examination into the economic factors which determine
value and which would be disclosed by an analysis of the stocks held
by Christiana. He was of opnion that the valuation should be based
upon Christiana's interest in the earnings of the underlying com-
panies. Those earnings averaged $90.71 per share. He explained
that it was sound practice to value corporate stocks at not more than
10 times their average earnings. Here, however, Dr. Friday used a
1826 F Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939).
17Ibid. at pp. 779-80.
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factor of 12 times the earnings of the underlying companies, or a
capitalization rate of 8 % which resulted in a higher valuation.
Further, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the auto-
mobile industry and of the chemical business, he used 12 times earn-
ings instead of 10 times earnings. Multiplying the average earnings
of the underlying companies of $90.71 by 12 he arrived at a value
of $1,088.52 for each share of Christiana. The same principle is
expressed as a certain number of years purchase. Thus 12 years
purchase indicates that the profits for 12 years would return the
price paid."
The Court then went on to set the value of the stock at
$1,100, saying As
"The adoption of the rule of 12 times average earnings of the
underlying companies for a series of years, or a capitalization rate
of 8 %, furnishes the fairest method of determining the value of
Christiana Securities Company common stock. The Supreme Court
of the United States in determining the value of shares of stock
adopted and approved the capitalization of average earnings over a
period of years at the rate of 6%. Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U.S.
202, 35 S. Ct. 795, 59 L. Ed. 1272.
"Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant based
upon a valuation of $1,100 per share for the common stock of
Christiana Securities Company and an adjustment of the subject
matter "
B. Dividend-Paying Capacity.
Paul says: 19
"We often look to dividend payments in connection with the
valuation of corporate stock. No doubt the dividend yield of stock
is to be given serious consideration in any valuation case, but this
test of value is one to be circumspectly used and a number of
other items of evidence must be checked at the same time.
A dividend policy may be influenced greatly by tax considerations.
Sometimes the purpose is to minimize the income taxes of the share-
holders. The undistributed profits tax worked in the opposite direc-
tion and unquestionably stimulated dividend payments. We have
to be careful, therefore, in these cases that we are not dealing with
an unduly conservative dividend policy which may weaken the
evidential effect of dividends as a valuation factor, or an unduly
optimistic dividend policy which may weaken the corporation for the
future, depriving it of necessary working capital."
In the Estate of Albert H. Stearns,20 the decedent died the
owner of 363 shares of stock in the A. T. Stearns Lumber Com-
pany The executor filed a return of $300 per share. The Com-
missioner valued the stock at $351.94 per share. The Board of
Tax Appeals affirmed the Commissioner, saying-21
"The taxpayer bases his entire claim for a valuation of $300 on
the average dividends declared and paid from 1913 to 1923. The
Ibid. at p. 784.
"Paul, op. cit. %nfra note 9, at pp. 1294-5.
1 B.T.A. 1252 (1925).
Ibid. at p. 1253.
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corporation, however, has declared over that period only approxi-
mately 63 per cent of its net profits in dividends, and the balance
sheet as of the close of 1921 shows an actual net worth in capital
stock, surplus, and surplus reserves of $871,962.80, or $581.31 per
share.
"The company has followed a conservative policy in respect of
the payment of dividends, and, under such circumstances, the
dividends paid are only one, and in this particular case a somewhat
unimportant, criterion of the value of the stock. The value deter-
mined by the Comrmssioner is fully warranted by the facts."
Dividends should be of less importance in determining the
value of stock in a closely-held corporation than in a widely-held
company because in the former the few holders can agree among
themselves to hold earnings in the company for later distribution.
C. Book Value or Net Worth.
Book value is usually given consideration but it is not as
important a factor as earning power. Therefore, if there is a
discrepancy between capitalized earning power and book value,
the former will, in most cases, prevail.
'Paul says .22
"Although the Board has commented upon failure to show book
value, the preference of the courts is definitely for the market quota-
tion method or the capitalization of earnings method. For book
values are frequently erroneous, especially in the case of closely-
held corporations, where a resort to book values is most necessary.
There is rarely a case in which the value per share of corporate
stock can be found by dividing book value of net assets by the
number of shares. This is especially true in a depression. The
capital stock of a corporation, its net assets, and its shares of stock
are entirely different things. The value of one bears no fixed or
necessary relation to the value of the other. This is particularly
true as to minority interests in a closed corporation; such interests
are usually worth much less than the proportionate share of the
assets to which they attach.
"The unreliability of book values also derives in large part from
the fact that they ordinarily represent original cost less physical
depreciation, depletion, and obsolescence of property; furthermore,
book values seldom take note of appreciation or decline in value.
Accounts and notes receivable may be of doubtful worth. Book
values fail, therefore, to represent present value. They may also
represent unjustified write-ups. Depreciation is a conspicuously
uncertain quantity because of the uncertainties involved in the repair
and maintenance policy of the corporation. Unreliable as book
values are with reference to tangible assets, they are perhaps even
more unreliable as to intangible assets. The value of intangible
assets is rarely fully appreciated, and it is deemed conservative book-
keeping to eliminate them from the balance sheet. The con-
clusion of the matter must be that book or asset value is only to be
used where no other standard accepted method is available; other-
wise the book values merely serve the purpose of checking or
tempering results otherwise obtained."
'Paul, op. cit. rnfra note 9, at pp. 1296-8.
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The possibilities for error inherent in the book value of a
closely-held corporation are set forth in Jereck Mfg. C0.
2 3 In
that case the taxpayer petitioned the Board of Tax Appeals to
determine the cost of the taxpayer's fixed assets for the purpose
of computing invested capital and to determine the fair market
value of such assets on Mlarch 1, 1913, for the purpose of com-
puting depreciation. The Board said.24
"In computing invested capital, respondent accepted, subject to
certain adjustments, the capital and surplus shown by petitioner's
books. In computing depreciation, he also relied upon the books.
He made no determination of value as of March 1, 1913. Petitioner
insists and we in effect have found that these books were wholly
unreliable for either of these purposes. Cf. Union Metal Manufactur-
ing Co., 1 B.T.A. 395; Rockford Brick & Tile Co., 4 B.T.A. 313; and
Donaldson Iron Co., 9 B.T.A. 1081. Many of petitioner's records were
lost in the flood of 1915. Such as were left could be read only by
the use of a microscope. The books, such as they were, did not dis-
close the existence of a large part of petitioner's machinery and
equipment. Often such cost as was shown was not the whole cost.
There was no cost account on the books. Capital items were often
charged to expense. There is nothing peculiar in this when we
remember that this was purely a family affair. The business was
begun by two brothers in 1852, and at the date of the hearing 92 per
cent of its outstanding stock was held by their respective families.
The strict method of accounting which prevails in those corporations
whose stock is held by persons who have no tie except corporate
success is not to be expected of corporations whose stock is held by
close kindred. So it was here. Neither could these people, prior
to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, have foretold that
March 1, 1913, would be the most important date in the history of
their corporation, nor that the peculiar statutory concept of invested
capital would become an important element in its taxation.
"Our findings as to the unreliability of the books are amply
borne out by the testimony adduced at the hearing. Petitioner's
president testified that he showed the revenue agent, whose report
is the foundation of respondent's findings, three large machine tools
valued at $15,000 or $20,000 apiece, which did not appear upon the
books. The representative of the appraisal company testified that
he and his associates made a complete search of the books and that
wherever they found cost they used it; that often the cost found was
only a partial cost and that time and time again they could not find
any cost whatever for machines in actual existence and active use
when the appraisal was made. Respondent's counsel subjected this
witness to a most searching cross-examination and brought out that
the cost of machine after machine could not be found in the books.
The reason for this became apparent when it was developed that
approximately two-thirds of the assets appraised were acquired prior
to 1902 and that there was but little change between 1897 and 1902.
The record discloses that the books of the company upon which
respondent relied furnished an wholly inadequate basis for his
determinations."
The Supreme Court of the United States looked -with dis-
12 B.T.A. 1165 (1928).
Ibid. at pp. 1175-6.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
favor upon book value in Virginia v West Virgnia,25 a non-tax
case involving the final adjustment between Virginia and West
Virgnia, dating back to their separation in 1863. The case was
concerned with the proportion of the debt of Virginia which
West Virginia agreed to assume and with the liability of the
latter for interest thereon. The valuation of certain stocks
became necessary to make the adjustment and the Court said -26
"It is urged that the book value represents actual value where
books are correctly kept. This is not necessarily true, as books may
be said to be correctly kept, in a sense, when they truly state the
items set forth. But cost carried forward may not be the same as
present value. Despite repairs and renewals, a suitable allowance for
depreciation may not have been made. It would be too much to say
that there is any controlling presumption and it clearly would not
have been 3ust to value the shares on a statement of book cost
and surplus without taking into consideration the earning capacity."
II. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN )ETERMINING
THE VALUE OF CLOSELY-EIKD STOCK.
A. INTRODUCTION.
Almost any factor which has any conceivable bearing upon
value will be admissible as evidence of value. And the Board
of Tax Appeals will consider and weigh these factors with the
other factors mentioned before earnings, dividends and net
worth. It should be noted, however, that the weight of these
additional factors will usually be slight. But every ounce of
weight may be important in finally tipping the scales.
The various factors which may have some bearing upon
value are innumerable. The cases set forth hundreds of such
factors. In the Estate of James P Hooper,2 7 the Board said.
"In arrivmg at a value of $45 per share for the William E.
Hooper & Sons Co. stock, we have considered the stipulated facts,
the testimony of three witnesses presented as experts by petitioner,
and all other evidence bearing upon the question. No witnesses
testified as experts in behalf of respondent.
"All of the witnesses for petitioner were qualified to express
opinions as to the value of the stock on the basic date, i.e., August 3,
1933. One testified that it was not in excess of $20 per share; another
testified to a value of between $10 and $20 a share, 'nearer ten than
twenty'- while the third arrived at a value of between $15 and $25,
and stated 'it would work out under twenty' From their testimony
it appears that they considered, among other things, the record of
earnings, not only of the company itself, but also of its selling agent,
238 U. S. 202 (1915).
Ibzd. at p. 215.
2'41 B.TNA. 114 (1940), discussed znfra, at pp. 127-8.
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the Hooper Sons Manufacturing Co., for the years 1926 to 1931,
inclusive, prior to the merger of these companies, and for the years
1932 and 1933, after the merger; the book value of the stock; the
cash dividend record of the two companies; the impairment of the
surplus account by losses of the business, and the maintenance of this
account by transfers from depreciation reserves; the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities; absence of any regular or established
market for the stock; the fact that 3,613 shares constituted a minority
interest; unsettled business conditions owing to the depression and
other factors, and the availability of other more desirable stocks at
low prices.
"In support of his contention that the stock had a fair market
value of $100 per share on August 3, 1933, respondent points to its
book value of approximately $145 per share; earnings of $11 per share
in 1933 and approximately $10 per share in 1934; a definite upswing
in the industry at the end of the month preceding the date of valuation;
an entry on the books of the corporation of $8,570 as the 'excess of par
value over cost of 306 shares of the corporate capital stock cancelled
during 1932'; the issuance by the corporation in 1932 of 340 shares at
par; and evidence indicating that there were several inter-family
transactions in the stock prior and subsequent to the decedent's
death."
In the Estate of Daniel P Hoover,28 the executor valued the
preferred stock of the Hoover Company at $50 per share and
the Class A Common at $5 per share. The Commissioner found
these values to be $95 and $15 per share respectively The Board
of Tax Appeals valued the stock at $83 and $9 per share
respectively The Board said :29
"The stock of the Hoover Co. has always been closely held and
no sales of the preferred or class A common were made on, or near,
the date of the death of decedent. The parties, conscious of this fact,
have submitted, and we have given due consideration to, a detailed
history of the company, its earnings and prospects; its unit and dollar
sales year by year in comparison with its competitors; its position in
the industry; the nature of its competition; the fact that its basic
patent had expired and was being used by others; the probable effect
of the maintenance of a capable research department and the develop-
ment of other patents; its record of dividend payments; its balance
sheets and statements of income and expenses; and the general
economic conditions, including the fact that the banks and stock
exchanges of the country were closed and it could not then be deter-
mined whether the depth of the depression had been reached or not.
In addition, we have had the benefit of the testimony of nine wit-
nesses, called by the respective parties as experts upon valuation,
whose opinions and methods of valuation differed greatly"
In the Estate of Joseph J Crowley,30 the executor valued
11,010 shares of stock in Crowley, Mfilner & Co. at $2,202,000.
The Commissioner's value was $3,027,750. The Board of Tax
Appeals' value was $2,752,500. The Board said:31
-38 B.T.A. 387 (1938).
= Ibid. at pp. 396-7.
S025 B.T.A. 340 (1932).
U Ibid. at p. 345.
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"We are convinced on the record before us that the value of the
decedent's stock at the date of his death was $250 per share. In reach-
ing this conclusion we have considered not only the evidence discussed
above, but all of the other evidence, including that relating to the
location of the store, its history, prospects, dividends, earnings and
financial condition, the nature of the business m which it was engaged,
and the pending litigation."
B. OTHER FACTORS OF SIGNIFICANCE.
1. Opinwn Testimony.
(a) Admissibility and Weight.
Opinion testimony as to value is admissible in stock valua-
tion cases although it is not given the weight which is usually
given to such testimony in real estate valuation cases. In James
Couzens,3 2 the Board said
"The method of valuation is in itself unimportant, so long as it
gives due regard to all the facts and relevant evidence, and results m
a value which has a reasonable relation thereto. There may be no
slavish adherence to a formula, Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S. 352;
Georgza Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 262 U. S. 625, and whether the method
should proceed from a definite study of, say, original cost, see Donald-
son Iron Co., 9 B.T.A. 1081, or cost of reproduction new less deprecia-
tion, see Paducah Water Co., 5 B. T. A. 1067, and compare Rockford
Malleable Iron Works, 2 B. T. A. 817, or from general opinions of
qualified witnesses, or from book value, or from recognized market
quotations or other data, must depend upon the nature of the property
under consideration and the extent to which such evidence bears a
relation to its value. Moreover, since it is the stock we are considering
and not the corporation's tangible or intangible assets, we are not
directly concerned with a method, like, for instance, that set forth m
A. R. M. 34, 2 C. B. (1920) 31, for arriving at the value of good will
or other intangibles separately from the tangible or other assets, or a
method for classifying or segregating the constituent parts which are
reflected in the value of the stock representing the whole."
Paul says .33
"Opinion evidence stands on a different footing from other evi-
dence. The Board and courts are not authorized to disregard evi-
dence of a fact which is unchallenged either by contrary proof or
destructive analysis unless the Board or court has knowledge of the
subject matter sufficient to form a contrary conclusion; thus the
Board is not authorized to discredit an unimpeached and uncontra-
dicted witness, at least so long as such testimony is not inherently
improbable. However, the Board has on many occasions refused to
accept opinion testimony as to value, even opinion testimony which
is unchallenged by the opposing party. The Board's prerogative is
based on the basic function of opinion in the law of evidence; that
function is to enable judicial bodies to arrive at facts. The Supreme
Court has said of opinion evidence: 'But plainly opinions thus offered,
- 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928), discussed znfra, at p. 1162.
'Paul, op. cit. znfra note 9, at pp. 1314-15.
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even if entitled -to some weight, have no such conclusive force that
there is error of law in refusing to follow them. This is true of opinion
evidence generally, whether addressed to a jury or to a judge
or to a statutory Board.'
"The Board may not, however, arbitrarily reject unchallenged
opinion evidence. There must be some grounds in support of a re-
jection. The question must always be whether the value fixed by
the Board is arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence, or
whether it represents judicial determination reasonably founded upon
evidence before the Board. Values found by the Board will be sus-
tained in the appellate courts in spite of the Board's rejection of expert
opinion if there is shown to have been any other substantial evidence
upon which the Board relied, or 'where the evidence does not compel
a contrary conclusion.' In one instance the court stressed 'common
knowledge' in support of the Board's rejection of expert opinion. The
weight to be given expert opinion testimony may, as in the case of
any other evidence, be influenced by the general experience and
knowledge of the members of the Board. But if expert testimony
is rejected and a conclusion is reached through the Board's own knowl-
edge and judgment, the record should show possession of such knowl-
edge."
In Am-Plus Storage Battery Co. v Commsswner,3 4 the tax-
payer corporation petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to
review a determination of the Board of Tax Appeals, affirming
the Commissioner's decision that the amounts deducted by the
corporation for officers' salaries were excessive. The Court, in
affirming the Board, said :3
"With respect to the purely opinion evidence adduced, to the
effect that, in view of what they did and the results obtained, the
compensation allowed to the officers was reasonable, it should be
noted that there was no dispute in the evidence with respect either
to the work done, or the results achieved, or the experience and abil-
ity of the officers. Such opinions, as is usual, were expressed with
respect to the point upon which the board was required to pass.
Such evidence, while competent and often exceedingly helpful, is not
considered binding, in the sense that a tribunal before whom it is
adduced is required to accept it, where same is contrary to the
tribunal's own judgment of the result of the facts upon which the
opinion evidence is based."
(b) Expert Witnesses.
Paul says:
3 6
"The qualification of the expert is a matter of first concern. There
is no fixed rule about qualifications; expert witnesses must show
knowledge of, and experience in, the business. The more experience
the witness may show in the crucial field and the more familiar he
is with the property subject to valuation, the greater will be the
weight of his testimony. Lack of qualification goes to the weight,
not the admissibility, of expert testimony Whether a witness is
35 F (2d) 167 (C.C.A. 7th, 1929).
'Ibid. at p. 169.
'Paul, op. cit. znfra note 9, at pp. 1313-14.
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qualified to testify as an expert is a question for the judge presiding
at the trial, and his decision is conclusive unless clearly erroneous
as a matter of law. A person is not qualified from giving an expert
opinion by reason of the fact that he is a person interested. The tax-
payer may, therefore, give his own opinion in his own case. However,
it would be unwise to rely entirely upon such testimony."
In DuPont v Deputy, the Court, before setting out the
formulae which Dr. David Friday used in evaluating the stock,
set forth Dr. Friday's qualifications at great length :a7
"David Friday. After graduating at the University of Michigan
in 1908 Dr. Friday continued as a teacher of economics, accounting
and finance. In 1917 he was head of the Department of Economics
of the Graduate School of New York University. In 1918 he aided
the Post Office Department in fixing the awards of just compensa-
tion to the telegraph and telephone companies during Federal con-
trol. In 1919 he returned to the University of Michigan as professor
of economics specializing in money and credit. In 1923 he became
a lecturer in Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Research
in Washington. Recently he has devoted himself to consulting work
in economics and valuations. He has acted as a valuation expert
for the Post Office Department, Michigan Railroad Commission, At-
torney General of Michigan and United States Treasury Department.
He has represented bondholders and stockholders mn valuing their
holdings. In 1926 he acted as an expert in the tax case of Senator
Couzens involving the valuation of the stock of Ford Motor Company.
In 1925 he was retained by the Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion. He testified for the Government in valuing stock. He is a
member of a number of economics societies and has written exten-
sively on economic subjects.
"Dr. Friday testified that in preparation for this trial he had
studied income accounts, balance sheets and annual reports of the
DuPont Company from 1928 to 1935. Before trial he had studied
them for the Laird Estate case. Also he had studied the annual
reports and history of General Motors and the fluctuation of auto-
mobile profits. He had acquainted himself with sales on the New
York Stock Exchange and with the list of private sales of stock of
Christiana Securities Company. Generally he had done the neces-
sary work upon which to base an opinion of the value of Christiana
Securities Company stock. In valuing Christiana stock Dr. Friday
sought to learn Christiana's share of the earnings of the corporations
whose stock it owned either directly or indirectly. Its principal asset
was the stock of DuPont Company. That company owned a large
block of General Motors stock."
The qualifications of two other expert witnesses were set
forth in detail.
Paul gives this additional advice about the use of opinion
testimony .8
"It is highly important that expert witnesses give the reasons
for the testimony they offer. The value of opinion evidence depends
a great deal upon its reasoning. Opinions by experts, which involve
*126 F Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939), discussed %nira, at pp. 778-9.
'Paul, op. cit. infra note 9, at pp. 1914-15.
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considerations and confusions rendering them of slight weight, will
not be adopted as an expert judgment of value. The categorical
opinion of an expert unsupported by facts is entitled to little weight,
and the fact that the witness has not seen the property subject to
valuation may be used against his expressed opinion. There must
be underlying facts upon the basis of which an intelligent judgment
can be made. The witness must give the reasoning and the factors
of his valuation. It will be found that opinion evidence is ordinarily
associated with and supplemented by other evidence."
2. The Economie Conditions of the Times.
Paul states :39
"Nothing is better settled than the principle that general economic
conditions existing at the date of valuation--especially the conditions
in the particular industry-must be taken into consideration in de-
termining the value of property. More nnportant, so must the eco-
nomc conditions for the future, as they are reasonably predictable
at the date of valuation. The important consideration in valuation
is always the future; valuations are essentially nothing more than
predictions of profitable use. The past is relevant only.m so far as
it constitutes an index of what is to happen in.years subsequent to
the date of valuation."
Examples of cases where the Board considered econonc
depressions are numerous. For example, in the Estate of Henry
Walters, the Board said :40
"On November 30, 1931, the history of the Railroad showed
steadily declining earnings, from the end of 1929 at about $15 per
share, to less than $10 on the date of death. The stock prices had
been going through a general decline, with occasional short spurts
upward, since the middle of 1931, when in July it was in the 90's,
in September in the 70's, in October in the 60's and 50's, until at the
date of death it was, as has been seen, 43-45. Since, as the evidence
shows, this performance was embedded in the general economic de-
pression which was at that time well known and widely felt, there
was no reason for belief that the downward trend had reached its
end, so that stocks which could only be sold piecemeal over a sub-
stantial period would continue to command the price of that day. With
the information at hand on that day which is present in this record,
one could not reasonably have expected to realize for the entire 35,966
shares to be sold during the forthcoming months an average price
reflected by a curve projected in any other than the general downward
direction which it had taken in the recent past."
And n the Estate of T. C. Thompson, the Board said :41
"At the time of the death of T. C. Thompson, the cotton-mill in-
dustry was in an extremely depressed condition, wide fluctuations
in the cotton market rendering it difficult to determine a manufacturing
or a buying policy. While some improvement over the depth of the
depression was at that time noted, the future was somewhat uncertain."
bid. at 1320.
435 B.T.A. 259 (1937), at p. 263.
"3 B.T.A. 902 (1926), at p. 904.
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3. The Effect Given to Subsequent Events.
It has already been noted that value is dependent to a great
extent upon the prospects of the future as they appear at the
date of value. Often, if not always, the date of valuation, as
distinguished from the date of value, occurs at some time after
the date of value. The question arises as to whether events
subsequent to the date of value may be considered at the time
of valuation. The answer to this question was stated with the
greatest possible clarity in James Couzens:42
"Serious objection was urged by respondent to the admission
in evidence of data as to events which occurred after March 1, 1913.
It was urged that such facts were necessarily unknown on that date
and hence could not be considered. It was apparent that there was
a fear that the Board would in reaching its judgment be influenced
toward a higher value if it were permitted to see the evidence of
increasing value after the date in question. The evidence was never-
theless admitted. It is true that value on March 1, 1913, is not to
be judged by subsequent events. There is, however, substantial
importance in the reasonable expectations entertained on that date.
Subsequent events may serve to establish both that the expectations
were entertained and also that such expectations were reasonable
and intelligent. Our consideration of them has been confined to this
purpose. Such subsequent events as have no reasonable relation
to the considerations of the date in question have been disregarded.
We have not, by looking at the subsequent events now known, found
what the value would have been had they been definitely known
on March 1, 1913. The only facts upon which our judgment of value
has been predicated are those reasonably known on that date. These
included not only those which had completely occurred, but also
those which were i process and those which were reasonably in
contemplation."
4. Miscellaneous Factors.
(a) Par Value is sometimes resorted to but it is a purely
arbitrary concept and is of little aid or persuasiveness.
(b) Cost, original or reproduction, is not a satisfactory
standard of fair market value.
(c) Appraisals are analogous to opiion testimony and as
such are of less weight than the facts upon -which they are based.
(d) And, of course, any evidence of prior sales, or bid or
asked prices, are of importance.
- 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928), discussed znfra, at p. 1165.
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